Restructuring the International Monetary Fund for the 21st Century

Abstract:
In the absence of a Westphalian voting system in the International Monetary Fund (IMF or the Fund), power tilts excessively towards creditor countries resulting in skewed crisis analysis and resource distribution. Consequently, exploring the democratic deficit within the governance structure of the Fund reveals needed changes in the quota regime and voting system of significant import. As the governance structure of the Fund is a product of the political and economic agreements embodied in the quota regime, addressing the quota bias will provide one means for a Fund in tune with the growing contiguous democratic consensus. Quota adjustments alone prove insufficient, therefore we will explore: reassessing the Fund size given the pressing need for a larger Fund as the present size is too small when compared to the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP); readjusting access to the resources of the Fund in accordance with the gross financing need of the concerned country; reexamining the voting system and the veto market; restructuring the Executive Board so that every member of the Board is an elected member; and the establishment of an Economic Security Council as a body within the Fund.
 

  The WTO deadlock

India believed that the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration effectively addressed its core concerns. A major developing country coalition (G-110) came into being. All developed countries are neither opposed to agricultural liberalisation (the Quad—Canada, Japan, E.U., U. S.—has been providing support to its domestic agricultural lobby) nor supporting it. Read more
   
 
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