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Restructuring the
International Monetary Fund for the 21st Century
Abstract:
In the absence of a Westphalian voting system in
the International Monetary Fund (IMF or the Fund), power
tilts excessively towards creditor countries resulting
in skewed crisis analysis and resource distribution. Consequently,
exploring the democratic deficit within the governance
structure of the Fund reveals needed changes in the quota
regime and voting system of significant import. As the
governance structure of the Fund is a product of the political
and economic agreements embodied in the quota regime,
addressing the quota bias will provide one means for a
Fund in tune with the growing contiguous democratic consensus.
Quota adjustments alone prove insufficient, therefore
we will explore: reassessing the Fund size given the pressing
need for a larger Fund as the present size is too small
when compared to the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP);
readjusting access to the resources of the Fund in accordance
with the gross financing need of the concerned country;
reexamining the voting system and the veto market; restructuring
the Executive Board so that every member of the Board
is an elected member; and the establishment of an Economic
Security Council as a body within the Fund.
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